It is well known that in a leverage regression, profits are negatively related to leverage. The literature (e.g., Myers, 1993; Fama and French, 2002) considers this to be a key rejection of the trade-off theory. We disagree. Contrary to Myers (1993), highly profitable firms typically issue debt and repurchase equity, while the lowest profit firms tend to raise external funds -particularly equity. The typical issuance is in the direction predicted by the trade-off. It is also true that more profitable firms experience an increase in both the book value of equity and the market value of equity. The effect of profits on equity drives the negative coefficient in the usual leverage regression, thus giving a misleading impression. Transaction costs may be important because we find that large firms make more active use of debt, while small firms make more active use of equity. Furthermore, poor market conditions lead to reduced use of external finance. The impact is particularly strong on small and low profit firms.
I. Introduction
The trade-off theory of capital structure predicts that more profitable firms ought to borrow more and have higher leverage.
1 The profits-leverage puzzle is the empirical evidence that the predicted sign is backwards. "The most telling evidence against the static trade-off theory is the strong inverse correlation between profitability and financial leverage. Within an industry, the most profitable firms borrow less, the least profitable borrow more" (Myers, 1993, page 6) . This relationship between corporate profits and leverage is widely regarded as a particularly serious defect of the trade-off theory (e.g. Fama and French (2002) ).
In this paper we revisit the profits-leverage relationship. We show that the standard empirical methodology has interacted with the usual approach to simplifying the theory, in a particularly misleading way. The empirical methodology has focused on leverage ratios, but interpreted them as if they were the result of debt market actions. In fact, the equity component is very important when considering the impact of profits on firm capital structure empirically. The theory has focused on intuition derived from static models with inadequate attention given to the dynamic impact of the form of transaction costs.
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The empirical problem arises in the standard leverage regression. To see this, let D denote corporate debt and E corporate equity, then leverage is L = D D+E
. Let x it denote a factor such as profits, with the subscript i for each firm, and t for the date. Let ε it denote the error term, and α and β be the coefficients to be estimated. It is common to run a panel regression such as L it = α + βx it + ε it . If x it is profits, then under the trade-off theory a more profitable firm has a greater need to shield profits from taxation, and so
1 The term 'trade-off theory' is used in different ways by different authors. For some authors it means that bankruptcy and taxes are being balanced (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973) . For other authors it includes agency-based arguments (Fama and French, 2002) . Some authors simplify by assuming that investment is unaffected, even though the cost of capital is changed by the leverage choice. Other authors actually analyze the impact of the leverage choice on investment. A recent review is provided by Frank and Goyal (2008) .
2 Our point is related to that in Leary and Roberts (2005) . The difference is that we focus on profits and we emphasize the importance of the simultaneous presence of fixed and variable transactions costs.
it is predicted that β > 0. Empirically, however, β < 0, and so the trade-off theory is rejected. This rejection is the profits-leverage puzzle.
This rejection could arise if the trade-off theory is indeed wrong. This is the usual interpretation. But the rejection could arise for a number of other reasons too. It could come from debt or from equity. It could come from corporate inaction, action in the wrong direction, or simply action that is in the right direction but not strong enough.
The standard interpretation is that the regression result is due to more profitable firms borrowing less. We will show that this is actually incorrect.
We present a sequence of closely related analyses that decomposes the standard regression. We start by replicating the standard leverage regression and showing that the standard result continues to hold in more recent data. The standard result holds for both book-and market-based definitions of leverage.
Since our goal is to trace the source of the 'incorrect' sign on profits, we begin with simple sorts (firm size and profits) and descriptive statistics. In this way, we document the frequency and magnitude of various capital structure rebalancing actions. The general pattern is that more profitable firms tend to issue more debt and are much more likely to repurchase equity. On the contrary, the lowest profit firms tend to retire debt and raise more equity capital.
These basic patterns are very much in line with the traditional interpretation of the static trade-off theory, but contradict the profits-leverage puzzle. So the next task is to reconcile these findings with the standard leverage regression results. To that end we examine the impacts of alternative conditioning factors, fixed firm effects, fixed year effects, alternative standard error assumptions, the use of changes instead of levels, and alternative normalizations of the issuing regressions.
We find that the defect is not with the theory, but with the use of scaled measures of leverage in which profitability can affect both the numerator and the denominator of the ratio. This makes the sign of the relationship between leverage and profitability theoretically ambiguous.
The main findings are as given below.
1. When a firm makes extra profits, the book value of equity increases unless the firm takes some sort of offsetting action. Similarly, when a firm makes extra profits, unless there is some sort of offsetting action, the market value of the firm's equity increases. Thus more profitable firms will automatically have more book equity and more market equity, unless the firm takes offsetting actions.
2. Among large firms: The highest profit firms increase their debt the most. Those with high profits experience large increases in both the book and the market value of equity. The highest profit firms tend to repurchase equity while the lowest profit firms tend to issue more equity.
3. Among small firms: Profit seems to have only a very minor effect on debt. Those with high profits experience some increases in both the book and the market value of equity. Those with low profits experience negative effects on market equity. There is a tendency to issue equity, with the lowest profit firms issuing the most equity.
4. Almost any optimizing model of an interior optimal capital structure will imply that the use of debt and equity will vary as market conditions vary. Empirically there is time variation in the corporate use of external financing. In good times, firms issue more net debt and net equity than in bad times. In particular, issuing equity in bad times is more of a problem than issuing equity in good times. The negative effect of profits on equity issuing is much stronger in good times than in bad times.
5. When firms adjust leverage, the magnitude of the adjustment is not sufficient to fully undo the impact of the underlying shocks. Firms do not return to a unique static optimum. They seem to 'underadjust'. In section VII we show that this is exactly what ought to be expected in a trade-off model in which there are both fixed and variable costs of adjustment. Full adjustment is costly so partial adjustment is typical as the firm balances the costs and benefits at the margin.
There is a huge prior literature on our topic, and so we cannot review all related studies. For a review of the literature see Frank and Goyal (2008) . The fact that there is an inverse relationship between profitability and leverage ratios has generated a variety of responses from scholars.
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One response in the literature has been to argue that we should not consider static models. The trade-off theory predictions can be more complex in a dynamic model such as that of Fischer et al. (1989) or that of Strebulaev (2007) .
4 Empirically, the response has been to argue that leverage and profitability are negatively related because firms passively accumulate profits (see Kayhan and Titman, 2007) . 5 This implies that at the time of rebalancing, leverage should be positively related to profitability. Mackie-Mason (1990) shows that companies with tax loss carryforwards are more likely to issue equity. Hovakimian et al. (2001) and Gomes and Phillips (2007) show that highly profitable firms are indeed more likely to issue debt. This is consistent with what we find. By contrast, Jung et al. (1996) report finding no relation between the likelihood of equity issuance and profitability.
Welch (2004, 2007) makes the important point that changes in debt and equity values and changes in debt ratios are conceptually different. This distinction also plays a role in our analysis. Welch (2007) stresses the idea that non-financial liabilities should not be implicitly mistreated as if they were equity by paying excessively narrow attention to financial liabilities in a leverage ratio. We have adopted his approach in the empirical work reported here.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the construction of the data and variables and provides summary statistics. Section III provides results from the fixed effects estimates of leverage ratios. Section IV provides the main results on debt and equity issuance regressions. Section V explores the debt and equity issuance responses of firms during good and bad times. Section VI examines the debt and equity issuances when scaled by total issuances and total capital. Section VII shows how the smooth pasting and value matching conditions from dynamic optimization have important implications for leverage. This helps explain why the reactions to shock are only partial. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. Data
We use conventional data sources, starting with the merged Compustat-CRSP data.
The data are annual and are converted into constant 2000 dollars using the GDP deflator. We exclude financial companies (SIC 6000-6999), firms involved in major mergers (Compustat footnote code AB), firms reporting financial data in currencies other than the U.S. dollars, and firms with missing data on our key variables. A significant fraction of firms have zero debt (the 10 th percentile is 0). Book equity is slightly larger than book debt. Market equity is almost three times larger than book debt.
Book assets average $2,191 million although the medians are considerably smaller.
If issuing or retiring securities incurs no fixed costs, then we would expect to see many small actions and very few large actions (Leary and Roberts, 2005) . If there were significant fixed costs involved in issuing or retiring outstanding securities, then small issues might not be worthwhile. Table I shows that although most firms issue little debt or equity in a given year, the averages are large. In other words, when firms actually enter debt and equity markets, they intervene massively.
6 These include debt, book value of equity, market value of equity, assets, book and market leverage, profitability, market-to-book assets ratio, and tangibility.
The mean constant dollar debt issue is $165 million (the median is $1.6 million). In unreported tables, we find that the average debt issue is about 8.1% of assets (the median is 1.8%). About 38% of the firms issue no debt; 8% issue between 0 and 1% of the value of their assets as debt; another 16% issue between 1 and 5% of the value of their assets as debt; and the remaining 38% issue debt in excess of 5% of the value of their assets.
The mean constant dollar equity issue is about $26 million (the median is about $0.4 million). As a fraction of assets, the mean and median equity issues are about 7% and 0.2%, respectively. About 33% of the firms issue no equity; 34% of the firms issue between 0 and 1% of the value of their assets as equity; another 14% issue between 1 and 5% of the value of their assets as equity; and the remaining 19% of the firms issue equity that is in excess of 5% of the value of their assets. Average debt repayments are larger than equity repurchases. This perhaps reflects the finite maturity of debt and its contractual repayment. The median firm does not repurchase equity.
We construct both book and market leverage ratios. Book leverage is defined as debt over debt plus book equity. Market leverage is defined as debt over debt plus market equity. The median book leverage is 0.36 (the average is 0.31). The median market leverage is 0.27 (the average is 0.20).
Profitability is defined as the ratio of operating income before depreciation to assets.
While the average firm is profitable (the ratio of ebitda to assets is 0.05), the median firm is even more profitable (with a profitability ratio of 0.11). The sample includes a large number of unprofitable firms as the 10 th percentile is -0.18. The table also reports descriptive statistics on the market-to-book ratio and the tangibility ratio. The market-tobook ratio (M/B), defined as the ratio of the market value of assets to book assets, averages at about 1.65. Tangibility, defined as the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to assets, averages at about 31%.
III. Estimating a Leverage Ratio
The previous literature focuses on estimates obtained using leverage ratios. Hence, we start with a similar estimation to check whether our results match those of previous studies. Table II presents the results. Some scholars advocate book leverage ratios while others advocate market leverage ratios. We report results for both.
The regressions include leverage factors following the previous capital structure literature (see, for example, Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2009) ). The factors include (i) profitability, (ii) industry median leverage, (iii) market-to-book assets ratio, (iv) tangibility of assets, and (v) firm size. Industry median leverage is estimated as the median leverage of all other firms in the industry (excluding the firm under consideration). Firm size is defined as the natural log of assets. Other factors are defined in Section II. We cluster standard errors by firm and estimate these regressions both with and without fixed effects.
In Table II we run conventional cross section leverage regressions. Since we employ the usual data, it is not surprising that our results match those reported in the existing capital structure literature, i.e., profitability has a negative sign in both the book leverage regression and in the market leverage regression. The coefficients on other factors largely match those reported in earlier studies. Firms operating in industries with high leverage tend to have high leverage. A higher market-to-book ratio is associated with lower leverage. Larger firms are typically more highly levered. The coefficients on tangibility are positive. The conclusion from The impact of profits does appear to be somewhat stronger among the high leverage firms. For instance in a book leverage regression the coefficient on profits for the first quartile is -0.105 with a t-ratio of -37.8. For the third quartile the coefficient on profits is -0.406 with a t-ratio of -101.5. This difference is curious and might deserve further study.
However, the fact that in each case we get the negative sign and statistical significance is sufficient for the purposes of the current paper. So the results on profits are rather robust across the distribution.
A. Frequency of Financing Activity Table III tabulates the percentage of firms issuing or repurchasing debt or equity for annual sorts based on lagged profitability. We employ the conventional 5% cut-off rule to exclude minor fluctuations. Firms 'issuing debt' are therefore those that issue debt (both short-term and long-term) in excess of 5% of the value of their assets. Other decisions are similarly defined using a 5% cutoff.
How does security issuance behavior vary with firm profitability? To answer this question, Table III sorts firms by profitability and reports the percentage of firms issuing or repurchasing debt or equity. The results show that the likelihood of issuing debt is mostly independent of firm profitability. Similarly, there is only a weak relation between the profitability and the likelihood that the firm retires debt. Unlike debt issues, the probability of issuing equity is strongly related to profitability.
Low-profit firms are much more likely to issue equity than are high-profit firms. Furthermore, high-profit firms are much more likely to repurchase equity. Accordingly, low profitability firms are much more likely to be net equity issuers than are high profitability firms. Among the firms in the lowest quintiles of profits, roughly 30% of firms issue 7 Cameron and Trivedi (2010) provide an extensive discussion of quantile regressions in Stata.
net equity that exceeds five percent of their assets. By contrast, for the most profitable quintile of firms, only about 8% issue net equity.
Firm size is an important variable in the recent literature -it is often used as a proxy for access to capital markets (as in Faulkender and Petersen (2006) , and Leary (2009)).
Small firms are bank-dependent, risky, and informationally opaque. They have restricted access to public debt markets and consequently face more severe supply constraints in their ability to issue debt. Thus, we expect small firms to be more sluggish in adjusting their debt and equity in response to shocks to profitability. Large firms, by contrast, have much easier access to public debt markets and they face fewer obstacles in accessing securities markets.
How do size and profitability interact? To examine this question, we first sort firms annually by firm size and then, within each size quintile, we sort firms based on profitability. The bottom part of Table III reports results for the smallest and the largest size quintiles. Among the small firms, there is little relation between profitability and the likelihood of issuing debt. However, larger firms exhibit a small increase in the likelihood of net debt issuance with increasing profitability.
The effects of profitability on equity issuance and repurchases are much more consistent across size quintiles. As profitability increases, firms are generally less likely to issue equity and more likely to repurchase it. Across the two extreme size groups, we note a striking difference between the proportion of firms issuing equity and that issuing debt. Among low-profit small firms, almost 41% are equity issuers, whereas only about 9% of low-profit large firms are equity issuers. However, regardless of size, we note a monotonic reduction in the likelihood of issuing equity as profitability increases.
Importantly, Column (8) shows that the likelihood of issuing debt and simultaneously repurchasing equity increases with profitability. Column (9) shows that, conversely, the likelihood of issuing equity and retiring debt declines with profitability. The effects of sorting on firm size and firm profitability mirror those reported for all firms. Again, we find that low-profit firms are less likely to issue debt and repurchase equity; they are instead more likely to issue equity and retire debt. Firms with high profitability exhibit the reverse pattern.
B. Magnitude of Financing Activity
In the previous section, we considered the probability of having a nontrivial level of debt or equity activity. The next question is how large are the dollar values involved. In Table IV , we sort the firms according to profits and then tabulate the levels and changes in both debt and equity. We do this first for all firms and then for small versus large firms.
For the analysis on all firms, we observe in Column (1) that debt peaks at the middle of the distribution. This is because firms with medium profitability are also the largest, as seen in Column (8) which reports average asset values for different profitability quintiles.
It is further confirmed when we sort first by firm size and then examine firms with different profitabilities within size quintiles. For small firms, debt is roughly independent of profits, while for large firms low profit firms tend to have a higher level of debt.
As expected, Columns (3) and (5) show that more profitable firms have higher equity values. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show that firms in our sample are quite typical of those used in previous studies, which stands to reason because we are studying firms from the most commonly used data set for such studies.
In Column (2) of Table IV , we consider the relationship between the change in debt and firm profitability. Consistent with the predictions of the trade-off theory, we find that debt issuances are significantly larger for more profitable firms. Also, consistently, less profitable firms issue more equity while the most profitable firms repurchase equity.
The fact that more profitable firms issue debt and repurchase equity while the least profitable firms retire debt and issue equity is consistent with the predicted relation between profitability and financing decisions under the trade-off theory. Columns (4) and (6) provide an explanation of why the leverage ratio regression results contradict those from the basic profitability sorts presented here. As we can see, profitability indirectly affects leverage ratios by increasing equity values. Changes in both the book value of equity and the market value of equity are positive and large for highly profitable firms.
By contrast, these changes are negative for less profitable firms.
We also examine two-way sorts by size and profitability and report results for the smallest and largest quintile of firms. For the smallest quintile of firms, the change in debt is largely unrelated to profits. But for large firms, there is a positive relation between profits and debt issuances. High profit firms have a big positive change in debt. Low profit large firms have a negative change in debt.
The changes in both the book value of equity and the market value of equity across profit quintiles are illustrated in columns (4) and (6). Large and highly profitable firms are associated with a big positive change in equity. For small firms the effect is much weaker. However the impact from the large firms is sufficiently strong that the patterns persist for the case of all firms.
Column (7) of Table IV is of particular importance for the trade-off theory. It shows that small and low profit firms tend to issue more equity than do small and high profit firms. Among large firms, the low profit ones tend to issue equity, while the high profit ones tend to repurchase equity.
The finding that more profitable firms tend to repurchase equity comes as expected from the basic trade-off theory. The fact that in general high profit firms tend to issue more debt is also as predicted.
This evidence also illustrates an important issue concerning the use of leverage ratios.
Such ratios are often interpreted as essentially reflecting the use of debt by the firm. This interpretation, while common, is empirically misleading.
For the typical firm, the change in the value of equity is larger than the change in debt. For example, in the third profit quintile for large firms, the mean equity issue is just $9 million, but the change in the market value of equity is $242 million. At the same time the mean change in debt is $27 million. This suggests that a fair bit of the observed variation in the leverage ratios is primarily driven by the changes in the market value of equity in the denominator, rather than by the changes in debt in the numerator.
Since equity issues are often small, this implies that the variation in the leverage ratio is primarily driven by internal operations rather than by external financing actions. This again points to the fact that leverage ratios can provide a misleading account of actual patterns in the data.
There is always a potential concern that the averages may be misleading due to the impact of outliers. To address this concern, in Table V we present median values of the profitability sorts. This table generally reinforces the findings in Table IV . The first observation concerning the medians is that an average profitability firm typically reduces debt. Low profit firms have a negative change in both book equity and market equity.
Equity issues are mostly found among low profit firms.
When we decompose small and large firms, important differences emerge at the medians. Small firms generally have no change in debt and some reduction in both the book and the market value of equity. Large unprofitable firms reduce debt and experience declines in both book equity and market equity. Large profitable firms at the median experience increases in both book and market equity. However experiencing an equity increase is quite different from issuing equity. For both large and small firms equity issuance is found primarily among the low profit firms. The scale of equity issues relative to firm size is much larger for small firms than for large firms.
IV. Estimating Debt and Equity Regressions
So far we have demonstrated that in our data the conventional leverage regressions have the usual signs. We then demonstrated that in simple sorts of the data, strikingly different financing patterns emerge. The next task is to reconcile these differences.
Table VI presents simple regressions predicting changes in debt, book equity, and market equity, as well as equity issuances. Consistent with the sorts, we control for changes in firm size, and we also include year dummies. There may be a concern about the speed of a firm's responses. Accordingly we consider the lagged change in profits as the main case, but we also include the contemporaneous change in profits. Whether the contemporaneous change in profits is included or not does not in fact matter. We report panel-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
The results in Table VI support the findings in the sorts. More profitable firms increase debt. More profitable firms experience increases in book equity and market equity.
However, profitable firms show negative equity issues, meaning that when profitability increases, firms tend to repurchase equity. All of these effects are statistically significant, and seem intuitively reasonable.
The fact that more profitable firms do actually issue debt is crucial from the perspective of the trade-off theory, as is the fact that these firms repurchase equity. However, these firms apparently experience a large increase in the value of equity.
In Table VI that there is a great deal of persistence in capital structure, so that a long term average does a good job of predicting what firms will do. Thus, we run all of our regressions using firm fixed effects. The long term average ought to reflect this targeting behavior.
We find that empirically very little changes whether we include firm fixed effects or leave them out. Thus the targeting behavior, to the extent that it happens, does not account for what we are reporting. Table VII provides an illustration. As is readily apparent nothing much changes when we include the firm fixed effects. Accordingly we do not think that the lack of concern for capital structure target seeking drives our findings.
The next step is to bring the sorts and the simple regressions together into a common setting. We therefore include factors in addition to profitability: (i) median industry leverage, (ii) the market-to-book assets ratio, (iii) tangibility of assets, and (iv) firm size (measured by the log of assets). Rajan and Zingales (1995) show that these factors are related to leverage in G7 countries. A number of studies have used these factors to estimate leverage targets. Frank and Goyal (2009) show that these factors are robustly related to leverage in the U.S. In these regressions, we use indicators for the quintile that the firm is in for each factor. (1) and (2), we examine debt issues and again show that profits positively affect debt issuances. The effects are large and statistically significant at the 1% level. Columns (3) and (4), which examine book equity show a strong effect of profits. This effect is only slightly reduced by the inclusion of other factors. Columns (5) and (6) illustrate that the impact of profits on the change in market equity is also robust to the inclusion of the conventional factors. Columns (7) and (8) examine equity issuances. Here we again find that profits have a significant negative impact on equity issuances. As before, the results are robust to the inclusion of the conventional factors.
In unreported tables, we estimate debt and equity changes using quantile regressions.
In terms of the signs and significance of the profitability variable, the results are qualitatively similar to the OLS results reported in Table VIII . Profitability positively affects debt issuances and negatively affects equity issuances across various quartiles.
While it is not our main focus, we note that the market-to-book ratio positively affects debt issues and changes in the book value of equity. However, its impact on equity issues is not statistically significant. 8 In the existing literature, finding a negative relation between the market-to-book ratio and leverage is common.
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Firm size has a substantially larger effect on debt issuances than on equity issuances.
This may help to explain the commonly observed positive relation between firm size and leverage ratios. , and not from D.
Overall, the results from the debt and equity issuance regressions are consistent with the trade-off theory. The coefficient estimates on the leverage factors generate several interesting results. Profits positively affect debt issuances. Equity issues are negatively related to profits. The market-to-book ratio positively affects the change in debt. Firm size positively affects the change in debt and book equity. Firm size negatively affects equity issues.
V. Are Financial Market Conditions Important?
According to the trade-off theory, capital structure is determined by considering the impact of costs and benefits of debt. The time variation in the costs and benefits of debt imply that issuance decisions would also vary over time. Furthermore, market conditions affect the transaction costs of adjusting. Adverse selection is a greater problem in a cold market than in a hot one. Accordingly it may be easier to adjust in good market conditions. Related ideas have been developed by Huang and Ritter (2009), Faulkender et al. (2010) , and Halling et al. (2011) . Faulkender et al.'s paper examines cross-sectional variation in adjustment speeds including market valuations and how they may affect adjustment speeds. It is natural to think that in good market conditions, it will be less costly to issue both debt and equity, and adjusting leverage to respond to profitability shocks would be much easier.
To test the importance of market conditions, we require a definition of good times and bad times. Our empirical strategy is to estimate good times versus bad times at the 4-digit industry level. We define an industry as having "good times" if the median firm in that industry has a market-to-book ratio that is higher than the 67 th percentile of the time-series distribution of the industry median market-to-book ratios. Conversely, an industry is defined as having bad times if the median firm in the industry has a marketto-book ratio that is lower than the 33 rd percentile of the time-series distribution of the industry median market-to-book ratios.
Panel A of Table IX tabulates issuance activity for profitability sorts in both good times and bad times. As might be expected, active debt and equity issuances are larger during good times. There is also somewhat more active swaps between debt and equity during good times.
Panel B reports the issuance activity for the smallest and the largest firm during the good times and bad times. Within each size quintile, firms are sorted on profitability.
This is a three way sort. As before we find that there is much more active use of external markets during good times. Small, low-profit firms are more likely to issue equity in good times than in bad times. Debt issuances are significantly higher in good times. Large, high-profit firms are significantly more likely to issue debt and repurchase equity in good times than in bad times.
Panel C reports the magnitudes of the financial variables rather than the frequencies.
During bad times, less profitable large firms retire substantial amounts of debt and they show a tendency to issue equity. Small firms do not seem to engage in similar debt reduction activities. However, like the larger firms, there is a tendency for small firms to issue more equity -at least to the extent possible.
During good times, large profitable firms raise significant amounts of debt as they experience an increase in the value of their equity. Such firms also engage in share repurchases. Debt issues by smaller firms are much less affected by their own profitability during good times and their change in debt is more or less independent of their profits. However, equity issuance is primarily found among the low profit small firms during good times. Table IX shows that, empirically, profitability has a time-varying impact on leverage choices.
In Table X , the basic regressions for changes in debt and for equity issuance are presented for both good times and bad times. Comparing good times with bad times, we see that the effects of profits are much stronger in good times. In bad times the impacts are rather weak statistically. This difference is interesting and deserves further study. However for our purposes recall that the static trade-off theory implies timevarying capital structure choices even when the target is time invariant. Empirically we do observe time-varying choices.
VI. Is Scaling Important?
In the preceding section, we provided results for unscaled debt and equity issues.
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This seems appropriate to us. However it involves making two changes to the standard regression. We would like to determine if both changes are crucial. Accordingly, in this section, we take a step back to consider prior literature in which variables are scaled. The questions are, how does scaling affect the results and why. (1) and (2) scale the debt and equity issuances by the total firm net issuance. Columns (3) and (4) scale the debt and equity issuances by the sum of debt and book equity. Column (5) considers the change in debt scaled by the sum of debt and book equity. Column (6) considers the change in leverage due to external financing. Since we are examining changes, we use the changes in the standard regression factors as controls. The primary interest is in the coefficient on the change in profits.
Column (1) shows that a change in profits is associated with an increase in debt issues.
But the sign reverses in Column (3) when we scale the debt issues by the sum of debt plus book equity. This is telling. What is really driving the results is the change in equity in the denominator, not the change in debt in the numerator. This result is further substantiated in Column (5) where the change in debt to capital ratio is used instead of debt issuance.
To further explore the impact of active issuance relative to passive experiencing of changes we decompose leverage in Column (6). We separate out the effect of debt and equity issues from those due to changes in retained earnings by defining leverage change due to external financing as:
where D is debt, E is book value of equity , d is debt issues net of retirements, and e is equity issues net of repurchases. Garvey and Hanka (1999) use a similar measure in their study. This measure directly captures the net leverage effect of debt and equity issuances.
Column (6) reports results from regressions of the net leverage effect of debt and equity issues on changes in profitability after controlling for other leverage factors in differences and year indicator variables. The key effect is the coefficient on the change in profits, which is positive. The effect of profitability on leverage change due to external financing is positive and statistically significant. This comparison suggests that changes in total debt and equity are only partly a result of debt and equity issuance decisions. Other balance sheet adjustments complicate the inferences from leverage ratio regressions.
In Table XII , we examine change in leverage and change in leverage due to external financing during good and bad times separately. The traditional negative effect of a change in profits on a change in leverage is found both in good times and in bad times. However when we decompose the impact in order to isolate the external component, as before, the result disappears. In good times the external financing component of a change in profits is fairly weak, but still positive. During bad times it is not statistically significant. This implies that distinguishing between good and bad times does not fundamentally alter the basic conclusions. The traditional leverage result on profits is driven by increases in equity that are experienced and then partially, but not completely, offset by firms.
To the extent that firms are engaging in active financing they are following the prescriptions of the trade-off theory. Thus we have overall a coherent picture of how firms are responding to profits. Basically, more profitable firms experience an increase in the value of their equity. They respond to this by issuing debt and repurchasing equity. But the magnitude of the increase in equity is larger than the magnitudes of the active steps taken in the debt and equity markets. This means that the firms' actual actions are as predicted by the trade-off theory.
But it leaves open the question of why they do not act more strongly.
In the next section we argue that partial adjustment to shocks is what ought to be expected generally. The idea is that both fixed and variable adjustment costs are real and need to be minimized in the firm's optimization problem.
VII. Trade-Off with Adjustment Costs
The capital structure literature has long been interested in dynamics and capital structure adjustment paths. In recent years this interest has increasingly resulted in explicit dynamic optimizing models such as those of Goldstein et al. (2001) , Hennessy and Whited (2005), Strebulaev (2007) . These models commonly make specialized assumptions leading some, such as Welch (2011), to question their generality.
In contrast, we argue that dynamic optimization (Dixit (1993) , and Stokey (2009)) does offer some fairly general observations about the required conditions for optimality when there are both fixed and variable adjustment costs. These conditions have important implications for tests of the trade-off theory that have largely been ignored in the literature on capital structure adjustment. As a result some rather misleading impressions have become widespread.
The basic conditions for optimality are known as: "smooth pasting" and "value matching". Standard analysis of cash management (Constantinides and Richard (1978) ), invest-ment (Bertola and Caballero (1990) ) and inventory (Stokey (2009)) all have an essentially similar structure. This structure can be reinterpreted as a trade-off theory of corporate capital structure. This works because the original models use fairly general assumptions about the shapes of the underlying functions, rather than making problem-specific assumptions. The presentation here largely follows that of Bertola and Caballero (1990) .
Consider a model in which excessive, or inadequate leverage is costly. Think of these costs as reflecting the taxation benefits of debt and deadweight bankruptcy costs. Leverage is the choice variable. Assume also that the firm has a nice concave production function with a unique optimal scale of operations.
The risk-neutral firm chooses leverage in order to maximize the discounted present value. Let L = leverage (the choice variable), r = the discount rate, ε = an exogenous Brownian shock process, π = profits (twice differentiable, and strictly concave), V = the firm's value function. The unconstrained maximum is given by
If there were no adjustment costs then the firm would always pick leverage to ensure that x τ = x * (ε) for all τ . This is the static 'leverage target'. Now suppose that there are adjustment costs. The optimization problem can be expressed as
To actively adjust leverage requires decision making. Adjusting takes time and effort on the part of executives, along with board members and investment bankers in some cases. Issuing securities also involves underwriting costs as documented by Altinkiliç and Hansen (2000) and Chen and Ritter (2000) . There will normally be both a fixed cost component and a variable cost component. Similarly, repurchasing securities will involve both fixed and variable costs (fees).
In general, there is no reason for the fixed costs and the variable costs of increasing and reducing leverage to be equal. In fact, there are good reasons to expect there to be four distinct parameter values. Consider what happens as the size of an adjustment shrinks towards zero. The average unit cost becomes arbitrarily large since the fixed cost component is divided by something incredibly small. But the profit function itself is smooth and has no such discontinuity.
Clearly it must be the case that a small enough (but strictly nonzero) leverage adjustment cannot pay. Furthermore, the point at which it becomes too small to pay will generally differ on the two sides of zero since the cost parameters differ.
With a setup that is essentially the same as this, Constantinides and Richard (1978) and Bertola and Caballero (1990) show that the model can be depicted as in Figure 1 .
The intuition is quite clear. If the firm is increasing leverage, then the marginal value of a unit increase must equal the marginal cost of a unit increase. Otherwise the firm could increase profits by making some other amount of adjustment. This pins down how large an increase will be if it happens. When will the firm choose to increase leverage? It will do so if the value of the firm is greater with a leverage increase than without. In other words the firm undertakes the leverage increase at the point when the value of the firm with the increase just matches the value of the firm without ('value matching'). The same reasoning applies to leverage reductions albeit with different parameter values.
Returning to Figure 1 , the value function v(z) is rewritten in terms of z t = L t − L * t . The steps to make the conversion follow those of Bertola and Caballero (1990) . There are four critical boundary values B la , B lr , B ua , B ur . Here B is a boundary value with the subscript l denoting lower, u denoting upper, a denoting action point, and r denoting the point to which the firm rebalances. Thus if L t < B la then the firm increases the leverage to B lr . If L t > B ua then the firm reduces leverage to B ur . If B la < L t < B ua , the firm neither actively increases nor decreases leverage. The only changes to leverage reflect the passive effect of the Brownian shocks.
As can be seen in Figure 1 the existence of the unit costs implies that increases and decreases of leverage do not return the firm to the unconstrained maximum x * . In each case the movement is in that general direction, but in each case the movement is partial.
It does not pay to go all the way due to the unit adjustment costs.
This has crucial implications for tests of capital structure adjustment. Firms will not adjust all the way to the static optimum. Instead there is movement in the direction towards the optimum. Both increases and decreases are partial. There is a large zone of inaction with a pair of outer boundaries at which it pays to readjust. There is also a pair of inner readjustment levels with a gap in between. This inner gap includes the static optimum. The larger the various adjustment costs the farther apart these critical values will be.
It should be stressed that the analysis in this section is essentially a simple reinterpretation of previous models. Since those models have a very general structure the interpretation in terms of leverage is not difficult. But by the same token, the ideas are not novel. What is novel is that the models also apply to capital structure.
A limitation is that the model assumes that the choice variable is one dimensional leverage. But interpreting leverage as one dimensional is a bit extreme. In reality, at least debt and equity can be distinguished. Formally analyzing a model with fixed and variable costs and with debt and equity would entail doubling the number of cost parameters.
The algebra would be messier. But the basic ideas would be the same for both debt and equity. We would need to characterize the smooth pasting and value matching conditions for both debt and equity. Assuming that the parameters differ, we would then have eight cost parameters.
The optimal actions would have more complex rebalancing conditions and more complex zones of inactivity. We would also need to decide in each case whether adjusting debt or equity made more sense. Thus, some inequalities would need to be presented.
For our purposes the details of such analytics is not worth it. The existence of zones of inactivity will remain. The fact that readjusting is only part way towards the static target will remain. The fact that the theory implies the directions of the changes will remain.
As the number of choice variables increases, so will the number of rebalancing points.
Instead of two rebalancing points, for well behaved functions we ought to find four. As still greater realism is introduced the complexity and the detail will grow. But the ideas of value matching and smooth pasting will retain their basic importance.
The magnitudes of adjustments will depend on a number of parameters, and some details of the functional forms. Characterizing these goes well beyond the scope of the current paper. What we want to stress is that the trade-off theory has clear implications for the directions of typical leverage adjustments. The implication for the magnitudes are much more tenuous and detail dependent.
VIII. Conclusion
The connection between corporate profits and capital structure has been very influential in the assessment of the trade-off theory. The standard evidence has pushed the literature away from the trade-off, and towards much more complex models and ideas.
As a result it is important to make sure that the evidence has been correctly interpreted.
Unfortunately, it has not.
In fact more profitable firms really do borrow more (not less). They tend to repurchase equity. They experience an increase in both the book value of equity and the market value of equity. Less profitable firms really do tend to reduce their debt and to issue equity.
Firm size and market conditions also matter. Larger firms tend to be more active in the debt markets while smaller firms tend to be relatively more active in the equity markets. During good times there is more use of external financing.
The usual profits-leverage puzzle result is primarily driven by the increase in equity that is experienced by the more profitable firms. Accordingly the puzzle should be restated as asking: why do firms not take sufficiently large offsetting actions to fully undo the change in equity? What limits the magnitudes of the typical leverage response to profit shocks?
In a frictionless model the partial response appears puzzling. But there is good empirical reason to believe that rebalancing entails both fixed and variable costs. These costs can be fully avoided by doing nothing. Accordingly, the firm must decide whether any given shock is big enough to be worth responding to. If it is, then the firm must decide how big a response is called for. These technical conditions are known as 'value matching'
and 'smooth pasting'.
Thus optimization implies that some shocks will be ignored. Even if the shock is not ignored, the optimal response will only partially undo the shock. The magnitude of the leverage response must balance the marginal cost and the marginal benefit of an extra unit of leverage. Since the marginal cost of adjusting leverage is strictly positive, the adjustment towards that static leverage optimum will only go part way. This is true both for leverage increases and for leverage reductions.
Surely nobody ought to be surprised that more profitable firms are more inclined to repurchase equity, while unprofitable firms tend not to do so. The fact that more profitable firms typically experience an increase in the value of equity is equally natural.
Were it not for the contrary claims in the literature (i.e. the profits-leverage puzzle), we would argue that nobody ought to find it surprising that more profitable firms are more inclined to issue debt. The fact that leverage adjustments typically only partially offset profit shocks, should also sound quite natural. These facts all fit together easily within the trade-off theory. These rebalancing choices equate the marginal cost with the marginal benefit of an extra unit of leverage change. Due to the unit cost of adjusting, when the firm adjusts it will adjust in the direction of the static optimum, but it will only go part of the way. Going further would not be worth the extra cost. Data sources: The sample comes from the annual Compustat files. The sample period is 1971-2009. We exclude financial companies (SIC 6000-6999), firms involved in major mergers (Compustat footnote code AB), firms reporting financial data in currencies other than the U.S. dollar, and firms with missing data on the key variables. All financial variables are deflated to year 2000 using the GDP deflator. The ratio variables are trimmed at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. This serves to remove outliers and the most extremely misrecorded data.
Variable definitions: Debt = Long-term debt (dltt) + Short-term debt (dlc) Book equity = Common shareholder equity (ceq) Market equity = Number of outstanding shares (csho) × Closing share price (prcc f ) Assets = Book assets (at) Debt issuance = Issuance of long-term debt (M ax(dltis, 0)) + Increase in current debt (M ax(dlcch, 0)) Equity issuance = Sale of common stock (M ax(sstk, 0)) Debt repayment = Reduction of long-term debt (M ax(dltr, 0)) + Decrease in current debt (−M in(dlcch, 0)) Equity repurchase = Purchase of common stock (M ax(prstkc, 0)) Cash balance = Cash and marketable securities (che) Book leverage = Debt/(Debt + Book equity) Market leverage = Debt/(Debt + Market equity) Profitability = EBITDA (oibdp)/Total assets (at) Market-to-book ratio = Market value of assets (MVA)/Assets, where MVA = Debt + Market equity + Preferred-liq. value (pstkl) -Deferred taxes (txditc) Tangibility = Net property plant and equipment (ppent)/Total assets (at) The table presents estimates of the leverage ratio regressions on firm characteristics. The sample comes from the annual Compustat files during the period 1971-2009. Financial firms are excluded. Panel A presents estimates of the book leverage estimated as the ratio of debt over debt plus book equity. Panel B presents estimates of market leverage, estimated as the ratio of debt over debt plus market equity. The explanatory variables P rof itability
, T angibility t−1 , and Ln(Assets) t−1 are described in Table I . IndM edianLev t−1 is estimated as the median book leverage of all other firms in the same industry in Panel A, and as the median market leverage of all other firms in the same industry in Panel B. The industry is defined at the level of the 4-digit SIC code. All specifications include the year fixed effects. The specifications in column (2) additionally include the firm fixed effects. We report t-statistics where the standard errors are clustered at the firm level in parentheses. The sample contains non-financial firms listed on the annual Compustat files for the period from 1971 to 2009. The table presents the percentage of firms issuing and retiring (or repurchasing) debt and equity. A firm is classified as 'issuing debt' if it issues debt in excess of 5% of the value of its assets; as 'issuing equity' if it issues equity in excess of 5% of the value of its assets; as 'retiring debt' if it retires debt in excess of 5% of the value of its assets; and as 'repurchasing equity' if it repurchases equity in excess of 5% of the value of its assets. In addition, we also report net-debt issuers, which are firms that issue net debt over 5% of the value of their assets, and net equity issuers, which are firms that issue net equity in excess of 5% of the value of their assets. We annually sort firms on lagged profitability and report the percentage of firms in each of these categories. The bottom part of the table reports the percentage of firms issuing or retiring securities by profitability within the smallest and largest asset quintiles. 
(8) , and c mean significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
∆D ∆BV E
∆M V E EquityIss.
(1)
∆P rof its The sample contains non-financial firms listed on the annual Compustat files for the period from 1971 to 2009. The table presents fixed-effect estimates from regressions of changes in debt (∆D), changes in the book value of equity (∆BV E), changes in the market value of equity (∆M V E), and net equity issuances (EquityIss.). The explanatory variables include current and lagged change in operating income before depreciation (∆P rof its and ∆P rof its t−1 ), and lagged change in the book value of assets (∆Assets t−1 ). In addition to fixed firm effect, the regressions include year indicator variables. The reported t-statistics are corrected for clustering at the firm level.
, and c mean significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
∆P rof its , and c mean significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) 
Debt and Equity Issues in Good and Bad Times
The table reports the frequency and magnitude of financing activity for sorts on profits for sub-samples of firms in good and bad times. An industry is defined as having "good times" if the median firm in that industry has a market-to-book ratio that is higher than the 67 th percentile of the time-series distribution of industry median market-to-book ratios. Conversely, an industry is defined as having bad times if the median firm in that industry has a market-to-book ratio that is lower than the 33 rd percentile of the time-series distribution of industry median market-to-book ratios. Panels A and B report the percentage of firms (a) issuing net debt in excess of 5% of the value of their assets, (b) issuing net equity in excess of 5% of the value of their assets, (c) issuing debt and repurchasing equity both in excess of 5% of the value of their assets, and (d) issuing equity and retiring debt both in excess of 5% of the value of their assets. Panel C tabulates the mean debt and equity levels, and the mean changes in debt and equity issuances. The sample contains non-financial firms listed on the annual Compustat files for the period from 1971 to 2009. The sample contains non-financial firms listed on the annual Compustat files for the period from 1971 to 2009. The table presents estimates from regressions of change in debt (∆D) and net equity issuances (EquityIss.) in good and bad times. The explanatory variables include change in profits, lagged change in profits, and lagged change in assets. The regressions include year indicator variables. An industry is defined as having "good times" if the median firm in that industry has a market-to-book ratio that is higher than the 67 th percentile of the time-series distribution of industry median market-to-book ratios. Conversely, an industry is defined as having bad times if the median firm in that industry has a market-to-book ratio that is lower than the 33 rd percentile of the time-series distribution of industry median market-to-book ratios. The reported t-statistics are corrected for clustering at the firm level. , and c mean significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Good Times
Bad Times ∆D EquityIss.
∆D
EquityIss.
(1) The sample contains non-financial firms listed on the annual Compustat files for the period from 1971 to 2009. The table presents estimates from regressions of debt issuance to total issuance (in column(1)), equity issuance to total issuance (in column (2)), debt issuance to total capital (in column (3)), equity issuance to total capital (in column (4)), change in debt to capitalization ratio (in column (5)), and change in leverage ratio considering only external financing (in column (6)). The change in leverage ratio considering only external financing is defined as:
where D is debt, E is book value of equity, d is debt issues net of retirements, and e is equity issues net of repurchases. The regressions include lagged leverage factors and year indicator variables. The reported t-statistics are corrected for clustering at the firm level. 
∆P rof itability (1) and (3)) and change in leverage ratio considering only external financing (in columns (2) and (4)).
The change in leverage ratio considering only external financing is defined as:
where D is debt, E is book value of equity, d is debt issues net of retirements, and e is equity issues net of repurchases. The regressions include lagged leverage factors and year indicator variables. The reported t-statistics are corrected for clustering at the firm level. An industry is defined as having "good times" if the median firm in that industry has a market-to-book ratio that is higher than the 67 th percentile of the time-series distribution of industry median market-to-book ratios. Conversely, an industry is defined as having "bad times " if the median firm in that industry has a market-to-book ratio that is lower than the 33 rd percentile of the time-series distribution of industry median market-to-book ratios. 
